cve/2023/CVE-2023-25187.md

### [CVE-2023-25187](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-25187)
![](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Product&message=n%2Fa&color=blue)
![](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Version&message=n%2Fa&color=blue)
![](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Vulnerability&message=n%2Fa&color=brighgreen)

### Description

An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.

### POC

#### Reference
- http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/173055/Nokia-ASIKA-7.13.52-Private-Key-Disclosure.html

#### Github
No PoCs found on GitHub currently.