Twenty-eight year folders sat above the README, so anyone opening the
repository scrolled past 1999 through 2026 before reaching a word about what
it is. The entries move to cves/ and the files the pipeline reads and writes
move to index/, which leaves the root at README, LICENSE and five
directories.
Nothing about the data changes. Every script takes its two roots from the
same place, and all five syncs report zero writes against the moved tree,
which is what a correct repoint looks like.
An Oracle Critical Patch Update page, an Ubuntu Security Notice and a CERT
vulnerability note all say the same thing: a fix exists. None of them shows
anyone how the flaw works, so none belongs in a list of proofs of concept.
26,070 of them were in there, inherited from a workflow that kept every
reference a CVE record carried.
advisory_hosts.txt names the destinations, matched as host plus leading
path, and update_cves consults it so nothing of the shape returns.
securityfocus.com/bid joins them for a different reason: the service is
retired and every deep link now lands on a search box.
The list is deliberately short. Packet Storm, Full Disclosure, openwall,
bugzilla, hackerone and the exploit archives all carry working code often
enough that a host-wide rule would delete real proofs of concept, so they
stay and are judged link by link.
The design asked for published and modified in the result column and the
frontend has been rendering them since the reskin, against a field nothing
supplied. Seeded from the CVE Program's daily release: 154,160 of 154,166
CVEs, so coverage on the indexed set is total.
The 590 MB archive is a one-off. Every record the delta log hands the daily
sync afterwards already carries its own dates, so update_cves keeps the file
current from work it was doing anyway.
Costs 0.86 MB gzipped on the index.
KEV reached the site three days ago but nothing in the markdown said a
vulnerability was under active attack, and the repository is what most
people actually read. 1,595 entries now carry a red CISA KEV shield beside
their product and vulnerability badges, marked for ransomware use where
CISA records it.
update_cves writes the badge on entries it creates, and the weekly audit
reconciles the whole set against the refreshed catalogue, so an entry CISA
adds gains the badge and one it withdraws loses it. Re-running the sync is
a no-op.
Every colour is now a Primer dark_default token. The header band, its four
capability pills and the heading above the trending table are gone, so the
search field is the first thing on the page and the switcher labels its own
table. Rows tighten to 10px, descriptions clamp to two lines, and the PoC
list loses its box for a hairline rule.
Blue is the only thing you can click. Amber means 500 stars or more and red
means known-exploited, and nothing else carries a hue: the star glyph is
dimmed at every value so the column reads as numbers rather than symbols.
The handoff's placeholder wanted an em dash. It reads "Search CVE, vendor,
product or keyword, exclude with -windows" with the middot the count line
already uses, and the six em dashes I had left in code comments are gone
too.
An advisory copied from a GitHub Security Advisory opens with "### Impact"
or "### Summary". The section parser treated any heading as a boundary, so
those descriptions ended themselves and reached the site empty. Only the
four headings an entry actually uses end a section now, and leading heading
markers are stripped when the text is rendered.
A trailing slash made exploit-db.com/exploits/41034 and .../41034/ two
different links, which put 53 duplicate rows in front of readers.
github.com also serves attachments and advisories, and 103 of those were
being parsed as owner/repo -- rendering "user-attachments / files" with an
empty star column instead of the PoC archive they point to.
The PoC vocabulary was English-only, so a repository describing itself as
"漏洞利用" — an exploit — read as evidence that it was not one. Chinese is
the second language of this corpus by a wide margin, and the same gap
covered Spanish, Portuguese, French, Russian, Japanese and Korean.
NON_POC_RE also vetoed "prueba", which is the proof in "prueba de
concepto", inverting the signal for Spanish repositories entirely.
On the 600-repository discovery sample this admits two more genuine PoCs
and nothing else.
A README caption in maniakh/CVE-2026-31431---Copy-Fail-PoC reads
"Copy Fail (CVE-2026-3143)", one digit short. That still parses as a
valid identifier, and the guard meant to catch it was satisfied by the
repo's generic exploit.py, so the PoC was filed against an unrelated
WordPress advisory. CVE-2026-8222 (Open5GS) collected a GiveWP lab the
same way. Drop an id from the same year that a longer mentioned id
extends, unless the repository name deliberately carries both.
Underscores are word characters, so the id regex matched neither half of
a name like CVE-2022-4174_CVE-2022-41742; read the separator-normalised
name too. Over 600 live candidates that recovers two real PoCs the gap
was hiding, Keycloak_CVE-2026-18963_PoC and CVE-2026-42945_NginxRift.
A repository dedicated to one CVE that calls itself a PoC and ships code
was still vetoed when its description happened to contain a generic word
like writeup, patched or detector. Check the description alongside the
name for PoC intent; pure scanners that never claim to be a PoC stay out.
Measured on 600 live candidates: 15 repositories gained, none lost.
Fall back to n/a for missing versions, matching the product and
vulnerability badges instead of rendering an empty shields.io chip.
0xMarcio