### [CVE-2025-58761](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-58761)
![](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Product&message=Tautulli&color=blue)
![](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Version&message=%3C%202.16.0%20&color=brightgreen)
![](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Vulnerability&message=CWE-27%3A%20Path%20Traversal%3A%20'dir%2F..%2F..%2Ffilename'&color=brightgreen)

### Description

Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. The `real_pms_image_proxy` endpoint in Tautulli v2.15.3 and prior is vulnerable to path traversal, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the application server's filesystem. The `real_pms_image_proxy` is used to fetch an image directly from the backing Plex Media Server. The image to be fetched is specified through an `img` URL parameter, which can either be a URL or a file path. There is some validation ensuring that `img` begins with the prefix `interfaces/default/images` in order to be served from the local filesystem. However this can be bypassed by passing an `img` parameter which begins with a valid prefix, and then adjoining path traversal characters in order to reach files outside of intended directories. An attacker can exfiltrate files on the application file system, including the `tautulli.db` SQLite database containing active JWT tokens, as well as the `config.ini` file which contains the hashed admin password, the JWT token secret, and the Plex Media Server token and connection details. If the password is cracked, or if a valid JWT token is present in the database, an unauthenticated attacker can escalate their privileges to obtain administrative control over the application. Version 2.16.0 contains a fix for the issue.

### POC

#### Reference
- https://github.com/Tautulli/Tautulli/security/advisories/GHSA-r732-m675-wj7w

#### Github
- https://github.com/fkie-cad/nvd-json-data-feeds