A CVE List V5 record names what it is about: a title such as "PAN-OS: Arbitrary File Creation Leads to OS Command Injection Vulnerability in GlobalProtect", a vendor and its products. None of it was kept, so a query for pan-os or prisma access only found records whose prose happened to say so. Every record now opens with the title in bold and a Vendor badge per affected vendor, refreshed from a local CVE List checkout in one pass and kept current by the daily sync for the records it fetches. Only the lines above the description move; descriptions and PoC sections are untouched. The pass also settled the heading link on cve.org and trimmed the stray space some version badges carried. The site index carries title, vendor and product for the 40 percent of indexed CVEs whose records have them. Search scores a hit in those above any position in the description, results show the title as a headline, and each page puts it under the CVE id, in the browser title, the meta description and an Affected row, with the block hubs listing it in place of the description's opening. The 35 MB metadata file the homepage needed before anything could be filtered is split in two for the page: the CVSS rows load with the rest, the advisories follow the index instead of competing with it for the connection. cve_metadata.json stays whole for anyone reading the API.
1.8 KiB
CVE-2016-10138
Description
An issue was discovered on BLU Advance 5.0 and BLU R1 HD devices with Shanghai Adups software. The com.adups.fota.sysoper app is installed as a system app and cannot be disabled by the user. In the com.adups.fota.sysoper app's AndroidManifest.xml file, it sets the android:sharedUserId attribute to a value of android.uid.system which makes it execute as the system user, which is a very privileged user on the device. The app has an exported broadcast receiver named com.adups.fota.sysoper.WriteCommandReceiver which any app on the device can interact with. Therefore, any app can send a command embedded in an intent which will be executed by the WriteCommandReceiver component which is executing as the system user. The third-party app, utilizing the WriteCommandReceiver, can perform the following actions: call a phone number, factory reset the device, take pictures of the screen, record the screen in a video, install applications, inject events, obtain the Android log, and others. In addition, the com.adups.fota.sysoper.TaskService component will make a request to a URL of http://rebootv5.adsunflower.com/ps/fetch.do where the commands in the String array with a key of sf in the JSON Object sent back by the server will be executed as the system user. Since the connection is made via HTTP, it is vulnerable to a MITM attack.
POC
Reference
- https://www.kryptowire.com/adups_security_analysis.html
- https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/us/politics/china-phones-software-security.html
Github
No PoCs found on GitHub currently.