A CVE List V5 record names what it is about: a title such as "PAN-OS: Arbitrary File Creation Leads to OS Command Injection Vulnerability in GlobalProtect", a vendor and its products. None of it was kept, so a query for pan-os or prisma access only found records whose prose happened to say so. Every record now opens with the title in bold and a Vendor badge per affected vendor, refreshed from a local CVE List checkout in one pass and kept current by the daily sync for the records it fetches. Only the lines above the description move; descriptions and PoC sections are untouched. The pass also settled the heading link on cve.org and trimmed the stray space some version badges carried. The site index carries title, vendor and product for the 40 percent of indexed CVEs whose records have them. Search scores a hit in those above any position in the description, results show the title as a headline, and each page puts it under the CVE id, in the browser title, the meta description and an Affected row, with the block hubs listing it in place of the description's opening. The 35 MB metadata file the homepage needed before anything could be filtered is split in two for the page: the CVSS rows load with the rest, the advisories follow the index instead of competing with it for the connection. cve_metadata.json stays whole for anyone reading the API.
1.4 KiB
CVE-2016-7055
Description
There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery multiplication procedure in OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c that handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.
POC
Reference
No PoCs from references.
Github
No PoCs found on GitHub currently.