0xMarcio
08d697bd12
A CVE List V5 record names what it is about: a title such as "PAN-OS: Arbitrary File Creation Leads to OS Command Injection Vulnerability in GlobalProtect", a vendor and its products. None of it was kept, so a query for pan-os or prisma access only found records whose prose happened to say so. Every record now opens with the title in bold and a Vendor badge per affected vendor, refreshed from a local CVE List checkout in one pass and kept current by the daily sync for the records it fetches. Only the lines above the description move; descriptions and PoC sections are untouched. The pass also settled the heading link on cve.org and trimmed the stray space some version badges carried. The site index carries title, vendor and product for the 40 percent of indexed CVEs whose records have them. Search scores a hit in those above any position in the description, results show the title as a headline, and each page puts it under the CVE id, in the browser title, the meta description and an Affected row, with the block hubs listing it in place of the description's opening. The 35 MB metadata file the homepage needed before anything could be filtered is split in two for the page: the CVSS rows load with the rest, the advisories follow the index instead of competing with it for the connection. cve_metadata.json stays whole for anyone reading the API.
1.7 KiB
CVE-2017-11580
Description
Blipcare Wifi blood pressure monitor BP700 10.1 devices allow memory corruption that results in Denial of Service. When connected to the "Blip" open wireless connection provided by the device, if a large string is sent as a part of the HTTP request in any part of the HTTP headers, the device could become completely unresponsive. Presumably this happens as the memory footprint provided to this device is very small. According to the specs from Rezolt, the Wi-Fi module only has 256k of memory. As a result, an incorrect string copy operation using either memcpy, strcpy, or any of their other variants could result in filling up the memory space allocated to the function executing and this would result in memory corruption. To test the theory, one can modify the demo application provided by the Cypress WICED SDK and introduce an incorrect "memcpy" operation and use the compiled application on the evaluation board provided by Cypress semiconductors with exactly the same Wi-Fi SOC. The results were identical where the device would completely stop responding to any of the ping or web requests.
POC
Reference
- http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153225/Blipcare-Clear-Text-Communication-Memory-Corruption.html
- https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Blipcare_sec_issues.pdf
Github
No PoCs found on GitHub currently.