cvelist/2020/16xxx/CVE-2020-16630.json

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{
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "cve@mitre.org",
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"ID": "CVE-2020-16630",
"STATE": "PUBLIC"
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},
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"affects": {
"vendor": {
"vendor_data": [
{
"product": {
"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "n/a",
"version": {
"version_data": [
{
"version_value": "n/a"
}
]
}
}
]
},
"vendor_name": "n/a"
}
]
}
},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
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"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
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"value": "TI\u2019s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK\u2019s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile\u2019s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission."
}
]
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "n/a"
}
]
}
]
},
"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"url": "http://software-dl.ti.com/simplelink/esd/simplelink_cc13x2_26x2_sdk/3.20.00.68/exports/changelog.html",
"refsource": "MISC",
"name": "http://software-dl.ti.com/simplelink/esd/simplelink_cc13x2_26x2_sdk/3.20.00.68/exports/changelog.html"
},
{
"refsource": "MISC",
"name": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-zhang-yue.pdf",
"url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-zhang-yue.pdf"
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}
]
}
}