"-Synchronized-Data."

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CVE Team 2021-01-26 21:00:42 +00:00
parent 2372a37734
commit 443360e88b
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11 changed files with 326 additions and 9 deletions

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"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "Tendermint Core is an open source Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) middleware that takes a state transition machine - written in any programming language - and securely replicates it on many machines.\n\nTendermint Core v0.34.0 introduced a new way of handling evidence of misbehavior. As part of this, we added a new Timestamp field to Evidence structs. This timestamp would be calculated using the same algorithm that is used when a block is created and proposed. (This algorithm relies on the timestamp of the last commit from this specific block.)\n\nIn Tendermint Core v0.34.0-v0.34.2, the consensus reactor is responsible for forming DuplicateVoteEvidence whenever double signs are observed. However, the current block is still “in flight” when it is being formed by the consensus reactor. It hasnt been finalized through network consensus yet. This means that different nodes in the network may observe different “last commits” when assigning a timestamp to DuplicateVoteEvidence.\n\nIn turn, different nodes could form DuplicateVoteEvidence objects at the same height but with different timestamps. One DuplicateVoteEvidence object (with one timestamp) will then eventually get finalized in the block, but this means that any DuplicateVoteEvidence with a different timestamp is considered invalid. Any node that formed invalid DuplicateVoteEvidence will continue to propose invalid evidence; its peers may see this, and choose to disconnect from this node. This bug means that double signs are DoS vectors in Tendermint Core v0.34.0-v0.34.2.\n\nTendermint Core v0.34.3 is a security release which fixes this bug. As of v0.34.3, DuplicateVoteEvidence is no longer formed by the consensus reactor; rather, the consensus reactor passes the Votes themselves into the EvidencePool, which is now responsible for forming DuplicateVoteEvidence. The EvidencePool has timestamp info that should be consistent across the network, which means that DuplicateVoteEvidence formed in this reactor should have consistent timestamps.\n\nThis release changes the API between the consensus and evidence reactors.\n\n"
"value": "Tendermint Core is an open source Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) middleware that takes a state transition machine - written in any programming language - and securely replicates it on many machines. Tendermint Core v0.34.0 introduced a new way of handling evidence of misbehavior. As part of this, we added a new Timestamp field to Evidence structs. This timestamp would be calculated using the same algorithm that is used when a block is created and proposed. (This algorithm relies on the timestamp of the last commit from this specific block.) In Tendermint Core v0.34.0-v0.34.2, the consensus reactor is responsible for forming DuplicateVoteEvidence whenever double signs are observed. However, the current block is still \u201cin flight\u201d when it is being formed by the consensus reactor. It hasn\u2019t been finalized through network consensus yet. This means that different nodes in the network may observe different \u201clast commits\u201d when assigning a timestamp to DuplicateVoteEvidence. In turn, different nodes could form DuplicateVoteEvidence objects at the same height but with different timestamps. One DuplicateVoteEvidence object (with one timestamp) will then eventually get finalized in the block, but this means that any DuplicateVoteEvidence with a different timestamp is considered invalid. Any node that formed invalid DuplicateVoteEvidence will continue to propose invalid evidence; its peers may see this, and choose to disconnect from this node. This bug means that double signs are DoS vectors in Tendermint Core v0.34.0-v0.34.2. Tendermint Core v0.34.3 is a security release which fixes this bug. As of v0.34.3, DuplicateVoteEvidence is no longer formed by the consensus reactor; rather, the consensus reactor passes the Votes themselves into the EvidencePool, which is now responsible for forming DuplicateVoteEvidence. The EvidencePool has timestamp info that should be consistent across the network, which means that DuplicateVoteEvidence formed in this reactor should have consistent timestamps. This release changes the API between the consensus and evidence reactors."
}
]
},

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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"description_data": [
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"lang": "eng",
"value": "RSSHub is an open source, easy to use, and extensible RSS feed generator. In RSSHub before version 7f1c430 (non-semantic versioning) there is a risk of code injection.\n\nSome routes use `eval` or `Function constructor`, which may be injected by the target site with unsafe code, causing server-side security issues\n\nThe fix in version 7f1c430 is to temporarily remove the problematic route and added a `no-new-func` rule to eslint. "
"value": "RSSHub is an open source, easy to use, and extensible RSS feed generator. In RSSHub before version 7f1c430 (non-semantic versioning) there is a risk of code injection. Some routes use `eval` or `Function constructor`, which may be injected by the target site with unsafe code, causing server-side security issues The fix in version 7f1c430 is to temporarily remove the problematic route and added a `no-new-func` rule to eslint."
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},

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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "Flarum is an open source discussion platform for websites. The \"Flarum Sticky\" extension versions 0.1.0-beta.14 and 0.1.0-beta.15 has a cross-site scripting vulnerability.\n\nA change in release beta 14 of the Sticky extension caused the plain text content of the first post of a pinned discussion to be injected as HTML on the discussion list. The issue was discovered following an internal audit.\n\nAny HTML would be injected through the m.trust() helper. This resulted in an HTML injection where <script> tags would not be executed. However it was possible to run javascript from other HTML attributes, enabling a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack to be performed.\n\nSince the exploit only happens with the first post of a pinned discussion, an attacker would need the ability to pin their own discussion, or be able to edit a discussion that was previously pinned.\n\nOn forums where all pinned posts are authored by your staff, you can be relatively certain the vulnerability has not been exploited.\n\nForums where some user-created discussions were pinned can look at the first post edit date to find whether the vulnerability might have been exploited. Because Flarum doesn't store the post content history, you cannot be certain if a malicious edit was reverted.\n\nThe fix will be available in version v0.1.0-beta.16 with Flarum beta 16. The fix has already been back-ported to Flarum beta 15 as version v0.1.0-beta.15.1 of the Sticky extension.\n\nForum administrators can disable the Sticky extension until they are able to apply the update. The vulnerability cannot be exploited while the extension is disabled."
"value": "Flarum is an open source discussion platform for websites. The \"Flarum Sticky\" extension versions 0.1.0-beta.14 and 0.1.0-beta.15 has a cross-site scripting vulnerability. A change in release beta 14 of the Sticky extension caused the plain text content of the first post of a pinned discussion to be injected as HTML on the discussion list. The issue was discovered following an internal audit. Any HTML would be injected through the m.trust() helper. This resulted in an HTML injection where <script> tags would not be executed. However it was possible to run javascript from other HTML attributes, enabling a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack to be performed. Since the exploit only happens with the first post of a pinned discussion, an attacker would need the ability to pin their own discussion, or be able to edit a discussion that was previously pinned. On forums where all pinned posts are authored by your staff, you can be relatively certain the vulnerability has not been exploited. Forums where some user-created discussions were pinned can look at the first post edit date to find whether the vulnerability might have been exploited. Because Flarum doesn't store the post content history, you cannot be certain if a malicious edit was reverted. The fix will be available in version v0.1.0-beta.16 with Flarum beta 16. The fix has already been back-ported to Flarum beta 15 as version v0.1.0-beta.15.1 of the Sticky extension. Forum administrators can disable the Sticky extension until they are able to apply the update. The vulnerability cannot be exploited while the extension is disabled."
}
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},

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"value": "Sudo before 1.9.5p2 has a Heap-based Buffer Overflow, allowing privilege escalation to root via \"sudoedit -s\" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character:"
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"name": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/01/26/3",
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