{ "CVE_data_meta" : { "ASSIGNER" : "openssl-security@openssl.org", "DATE_PUBLIC" : "2017-12-07T00:00:00", "ID" : "CVE-2017-3737", "STATE" : "PUBLIC" }, "affects" : { "vendor" : { "vendor_data" : [ { "product" : { "product_data" : [ { "product_name" : "OpenSSL", "version" : { "version_data" : [ { "version_value" : "1.0.2b-1.0.2m" } ] } } ] }, "vendor_name" : "OpenSSL Software Foundation" } ] } }, "data_format" : "MITRE", "data_type" : "CVE", "data_version" : "4.0", "description" : { "description_data" : [ { "lang" : "eng", "value" : "OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an \"error state\" mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer. In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having already received a fatal error. OpenSSL version 1.0.2b-1.0.2m are affected. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2n. OpenSSL 1.1.0 is not affected." } ] }, "problemtype" : { "problemtype_data" : [ { "description" : [ { "lang" : "eng", "value" : "Unauthenticated read/unencrypted write" } ] } ] }, "references" : { "reference_data" : [ { "url" : "https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20171207.txt" } ] } }