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80 lines
4.7 KiB
JSON
80 lines
4.7 KiB
JSON
{
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"id": "CVE-2024-31463",
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"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
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"published": "2024-04-17T16:15:08.637",
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"lastModified": "2024-11-21T09:13:34.760",
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"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
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"cveTags": [],
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1. "
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},
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{
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"lang": "es",
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"value": "Ironic-image es una implementaci\u00f3n de OpenStack Ironic empaquetada y configurada por Metal3. Cuando el modo de proxy inverso est\u00e1 habilitado mediante la variable `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` establecida en `true`, 1) las credenciales b\u00e1sicas HTTP se validan en el lado HTTPD en un contenedor separado, no en el servicio Ironic en s\u00ed y 2) Ironic escucha en la red host en un puerto privado 6388 en localhost de forma predeterminada. Como resultado, cuando se utiliza el modo de proxy inverso, cualquier usuario Pod o Unix local en el plano de control Node puede acceder a la API Ironic en el puerto privado sin autenticaci\u00f3n. Un problema similar afecta a Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` establecido en `true`), aunque el potencial de ataque es menor all\u00ed. Este problema afecta a los operadores que implementan ironic-image en el modo de proxy inverso, que es el modo recomendado cuando se usa TLS (tambi\u00e9n recomendado), con la variable `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` desarmada o configurada en un valor num\u00e9rico. En este caso, un atacante con privilegios suficientes para iniciar un pod en el plano de control con red de host puede acceder a la API Ironic y usarla para modificar la m\u00e1quina b\u00e1sica, por ejemplo, aprovisionarla con una nueva imagen o cambiar la configuraci\u00f3n del BIOS. Esta vulnerabilidad se soluciona en 24.1.1."
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}
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],
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"metrics": {
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"cvssMetricV31": [
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{
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
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"type": "Secondary",
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"cvssData": {
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"version": "3.1",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
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"baseScore": 4.7,
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"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
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"attackVector": "LOCAL",
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"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
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"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
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"userInteraction": "NONE",
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"scope": "UNCHANGED",
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"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
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"availabilityImpact": "NONE"
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},
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"exploitabilityScore": 1.0,
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"impactScore": 3.6
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}
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]
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},
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"weaknesses": [
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{
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
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"type": "Secondary",
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"description": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "CWE-288"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/commit/48e40bd30d49aefabac6fc80204a8650b13d10b4",
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/pull/494",
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/security/advisories/GHSA-g2cm-9v5f-qg7r",
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/commit/48e40bd30d49aefabac6fc80204a8650b13d10b4",
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"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/pull/494",
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"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/security/advisories/GHSA-g2cm-9v5f-qg7r",
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"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
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}
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]
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} |