morluto
5f27e02fae
* refactor(domain): split error taxonomy into thematic modules Move each error family out of domain/errors.ts into its own module (base, core, provider selection/adapter, browser observation, artifact, evidence, unknown registry, hopper, configuration) and relocate AnalysisErrorProjection to analysisErrorProjection. Migrate all 162 importers to the owning modules and delete errors.ts. No re-export shims; behavior is unchanged. * refactor(runtime): name all silent catch causes without changing diagnostics Bind cause in every bare catch and unhandled rejection across src/. Real failures preserve the cause for logging; best-effort cleanup carries an explicit comment. Caller-visible and Evidence strings are byte-identical to before.
98 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
98 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
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import {
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browserOriginSchema,
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sanitizeBrowserUrl,
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} from "../domain/browserObservation.js";
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import type {
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JavaScriptRuntimeLocation,
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JavaScriptRuntimeTargetLocation,
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} from "../domain/javascriptRuntimeObservation.js";
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import { authorizedElectronFile } from "./ElectronFileScope.js";
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export type RuntimeLocationDecision =
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| { readonly allowed: true; readonly location: JavaScriptRuntimeLocation }
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| {
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readonly allowed: false;
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readonly reason: "unsupported_location";
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};
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/** Resolve a protocol location exposed by the explicitly selected Inspector endpoint. */
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export const authorizeRuntimeLocation = async (
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value: string,
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): Promise<RuntimeLocationDecision> => {
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if (value.startsWith("node:") && value.length > 0)
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return {
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allowed: true,
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location: { kind: "builtin", specifier: value },
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};
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if (value.startsWith("file:")) {
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const filePath = await authorizedElectronFile(value);
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return filePath === undefined
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? { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" }
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: { allowed: true, location: { kind: "file", file_path: filePath } };
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}
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let url: URL;
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try {
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url = new URL(value);
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} catch (cause: unknown) {
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// Non-URL input is outside the authorized runtime scope.
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void cause;
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return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
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}
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if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol))
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return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
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const parsedOrigin = browserOriginSchema.safeParse(url.origin);
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if (!parsedOrigin.success)
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return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
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return {
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allowed: true,
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location: {
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kind: "url",
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origin: parsedOrigin.data,
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sanitized_url: sanitizeBrowserUrl(value).url,
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},
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};
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};
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/** Interpret Node's lossy discovery metadata separately from scriptParsed URLs. */
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export const authorizeRuntimeTargetLocation = async (
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value: string,
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context: { readonly type: string; readonly product: string },
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): Promise<
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| {
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readonly allowed: true;
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readonly location: JavaScriptRuntimeTargetLocation;
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}
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| { readonly allowed: false; readonly reason: "unsupported_location" }
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> => {
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if (
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context.type !== "node" ||
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!/^node\.js\/v/iu.test(context.product) ||
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!value.startsWith("file://")
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)
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return authorizeRuntimeLocation(value);
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const reportedPath = value.slice("file://".length);
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if (!reportedPath.startsWith("/") && !/^[a-z]:[/\\_]/iu.test(reportedPath))
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return authorizeRuntimeLocation(value);
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// Node concatenates the pathname, then replaces quotes and backslashes with
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// underscores. A remaining underscore cannot prove which pathname was used.
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if (process.platform !== "win32" && !/[_"\\]/u.test(reportedPath)) {
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if (reportedPath.startsWith("/")) {
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const decision = await authorizeRuntimeLocation(
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pathToFileURL(reportedPath).href,
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);
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if (decision.allowed) return decision;
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}
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}
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return {
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allowed: true,
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location: {
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kind: "unresolved",
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reported_url: value,
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reason: "unverifiable-file-location",
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},
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};
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};
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